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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES, FREE SPEECH, SUPREMACY 
CLAUSE 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a Ninth Judicial District Court order granting a special motion to dismiss 
under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, in an employment matter. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 District Court’s order affirmed because Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute – being neutral and 
procedural, and not undermining any federal interests – applies to federal causes of action, and 
the plaintiff failed to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding communications protected by 
the statute. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Greg John (“John”), a security officer with the Douglas County School District 
(“DCSD”), was first suspended, then terminated, because of his unprofessional behavior.  John’s 
suspension came about in 2003 after a former co-worker told DCSD during his exit interview 
that John made racial and sexual remarks about students, and that John videotaped special-
education students and recorded sexually explicit narrations to accompany the video.  
Additionally, a fellow employee accused John of sexual harassment. Sexual misconduct training, 
anger management, and a warning that further unprofessional conduct would result in John’s 
termination accompanied the two-week unpaid suspension.  DCSD also banned John from using 
the school’s video surveillance equipment.  Upset about the disciplinary actions, John filed a 
union grievance and a subsequent EEOC, both of which were decided in DCSD’s favor.  When 
John failed to cooperate in a 2005 investigation regarding his inappropriate acquisition of 
confidential student disciplinary records, DCSD fired him. 
  
 In 2004, after the EEOC dismissed his claim, John sued DCSD and several employees 
(collectively, “DCSD”) alleging: (1) religious discrimination; (2) a violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3) an unlawful free-speech restriction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
and (4) false and defamatory statements.  The district court dismissed the state-based defamation 
claim, but kept alive his three federal claims.  Upon his termination, John amended his complaint 
to include a wrongful termination claim and to add as a defendant the DCSD officer who fired 
him.   
 
DCSD moved to have the case dismissed under NRS 41.660 because the statute protects 
the actions of the officials and personnel relating to the investigations of John.  Additionally, 
DCSD asserted all of the allegedly illegal communications actually were truthful and privileged.  
Finding that DCSD’s actions were protected under NRS 41.660 and that John failed to meet his 
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burden to survive a special motion to dismiss under the statute, the district court granted DCSD’s 
motion.  This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
I. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
 
 Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPs”) are meritless suits filed 
“primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights”2 by increasing litigation 
costs until the defendant’s case is weakened or abandoned.3  As explained by the Nevada 
Legislature when amending its anti-SLAPP statute in 1997, SLAPP lawsuits abuse the judicial 
process by chilling, intimidating, and punishing individuals for their involvement in public 
affairs.4  The Court compared anti-SLAPP statutes to the Noerr-Penningtion immunity doctrine, 
which grants general immunity to “those who petition all departments of the government for 
redress.”5  In Nevada, NRS 41.650 grants civil immunity to persons who engage in “good faith 
communication in furtherance of the right to petition.”6
 
 
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is codified at NRS 41.635 through NRS 41.670.  Rather 
than acting as a bar to all substantive claims that might fall under its umbrella, Nevada’s anti-
SLAPP statute allows meritorious claims against those whose governmental communications are 
not in good faith, while prohibiting only those claims intended to abuse other citizens’ rights to 
petition or communicate with their government.7  Among the classes of protected 
communications are those “regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective 
governmental entity”8 and truthful, or unknowingly false, statements before a governmental 
body.9  If a plaintiff files a lawsuit based upon a protected communication, the defendant may 
file a special motion to dismiss within sixty (60) days.10
 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
 Specials motions to dismiss under NRS 41.660(2) are treated as motions for summary 
judgment, and the granting of the motion serves as an adjudication on the merits.11  Pursuant to 
Wood v. Safeway,12
 
 the standard of review, like that of customary motions for summary 
judgment, is de novo.   
The Court explained that the party filing the special motion to dismiss under NRS 
41.660(2) bears the initial burden of showing that the lawsuit is based upon a “good faith 
                                                 
2 Dickens v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 11 Cal Rptr. 3d 877, 882 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 
3 U.S. Ex Rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
4 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, Preamble, at 1364. 
5 Empress LLC v. City and County, 419 F. 3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.650 (2007). 
7 Id. § 41.637. 
8 Id. § 41.637(2). 
9 Id. § 41.637(3). 
10.Id. § 41.660(2). 
11 Id. § 41.660(3)-(4). 
12 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
communication in furtherance of the right to petition.”13  Once this threshold is established, the 
burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
sufficient to survive summary judgment on this issue.14
 
  If the nonmoving party meets its burden, 
the case moves on; if not, it is dismissed. 
III. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Applies to Federal Claims 
 
 John argued that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to his federal claims 
because federal law preempts the application of state sovereign-immunity statutes to shield 
against federal civil rights claims. The Court disagreed, holding that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP 
statute neither undermines federal interests nor serves as a sovereign-immunity statute. 
 
 1. The Sovereign Immunity Issue 
 
 The Court easily did away with John’s argument that because state sovereign-immunity 
laws cannot insulate the state from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims,15
 
 Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute 
cannot immunize DCSD from his claims.  The Court explained that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute 
is not a sovereign-immunity statute because rather than barring all claims, the statute in 
questions only bars unmeritorious claims designed to impede on others’ rights to free speech.  
Therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute actually aligns with the reasoning of holdings excluding civil 
rights claims from sovereign-immunity preclusion, so federal law does not preempt its 
applications to John’s claims against DCSD. 
 2. The Federal Interest Analysis 
 
 First, the Court held that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is both neutral and procedural, 
thus giving Nevada courts the right to apply it in cases involving federal substantive claims.  The 
Court turned to California case law in determining that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is 
procedural.  California’s anti-SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada’s 
statute, and the California Court of Appeals has applied it to federal civil rights claims after 
finding the statute procedural in nature.16  In drawing analogies between the California and 
Nevada laws, the Court highlighted their myriad similarities, including the sixty-day window for 
filing a special motion to dismiss,17 the burden-shifting process,18 and the treatment of the 
special motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment.19
                                                 
13 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.650; see Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) (noting that “[a] defendant filing an anti-SLAPP motion must make an initial prima facie showing that 
the plaintiff’s suit arises from an act in furtherance if the defendant’s rights of petition or free speech”). 
  Like rules of civil procedure, 
the Court reasoned, Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute simply provides a pretrial mechanism for 
filtering frivolous claims and does not create any substantive rights or defenses. 
14 See Globetrotter, 63 F. Supp. at 1129  (recognizing that under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, the nonmoving 
party must demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits). 
15 Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 62 n.5, 953 P.2d 18, 23 n.5 (1998). 
16 Bradbury v. Superior Court (Spencer), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 213 (Ct. App. 1996); see generally Vergos v. 
McNeal, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647 (Ct. App. 2007). 
17 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660(2); CAL. CIV.  PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). 
18 Globetrotter, 63 F. Supp. at 1129. 
19 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660(3); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1)-(3). 
 
Regarding neutrality, the Court found the statute to be neutral because it applies to both 
state and federal claims, and to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims alike.  
Additionally, it applies only to cases invoking the classes of communications enumerated in NRS 
41.637.  Because the statute is neutral and limited in its application, the Court held, it meets the 
neutrality standard applying state procedural law to federal claims.20
 
 
 Next, the Court addressed whether application of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute would 
defeat or frustrate any substantive federal rights or interests, thus precluding its application 
altogether.21  Because anti-SLAPP statutes serve similar purposes as the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the “weeding out of meritless claims before trial”22 and actually protect the right to 
petition the government with repercussions,23 the Court held that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute 
did not violate any substantive government interests in this case.  John’s religious discrimination 
and ADA claims would have survived had he raised genuine issues of material fact regarding 
DCSD’s actions.  John’s First Amendment claim, stemming from his objection over the removal 
of his surveillance duties, would have survived had he rebutted DCSD’s argument that, as a 
matter of law, certain speech in the employment setting does not receive constitutional 
protection.24
 
  
IV. Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Protects Both Individuals and Government Entities 
 
 John argued in the alternative that the communications between DCSD and its employees 
were not protected because they were retaliatory and discriminatory, and they were not made to a 
government agency.  The Court held the employee communications were protected because NRS 
41.637(2) applies to political subdivisions of the state, as defined by NRS 41.0305,25 which 
includes school districts.  Additionally, the Court, following California’s lead in Raining Data 
Corp. v. Barrenechea,26
 
 held that employers, like DCSD, also receive protection under Nevada’s 
anti-SLAPP statute provided they can show the lawsuit arose from protected communications, 
and that the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  
 The defendants presented prima facie cases that their communications were truthful or 
made without knowledge of falsehood, and that they were of reasonable concern to the school 
district.  The burden then shifted to John to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding these 
elements, which he failed to do.  Thus, the Court held the district court was correct in granting 
DCSD’s special motion to dismiss. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
20 See 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 124.61 (3d ed. 2009). 
21 Id. at ¶ 124.62. 
22 Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 972. 
23 Id. at 973. 
24 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
25 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.640 (2007) (“Political subdivision” has the meaning ascribed to it in NEV. REV. STAT. § 
41.0305 (2007)). 
26 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 The Court concluded that, because Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute is neutral and 
procedural, and because it does not undermine any important federal interests, it applies to 
federal causes of action as well as state causes of action.  Additionally, the Court concluded that 
the statute protects communications to all political subdivisions, including school districts, and 
employers may seek its protection just as individuals may seek its protection.  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the district court was correct to grant the special motion to dismiss under NRS 
41.660(2) because DCSD established a prima face case for protection and John failed to meet his 
burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature of the communications.  
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of John’s complaint.  
